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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CASE NO.
10944

v.
EUGENE MEYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant appeals from a judgement of conviction of the crime of possession of narcotic drugs
rendered by a jury on February 8, 1967, in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, presidng.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 19, 1965, appellant was charged
by information with the crime of unlawfully possessing a narcotic drug, to wit: heroin and demerol
(TR-360). On November 261 1965, appellant filed a
motion to supress certain items of evidence. On December 2, 1965, the motion was denied in a memo-
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randum decision of the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
(TR-362, -370). On April 29, 1966, a hearing was held
on appellant's motion to quash the search warrant
before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, which mo·
tion was denied. Appellant was convicted of the of·
fense charged on February 8, 1967, and on March
3, 1967, appellant's motion for new trial was heard
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux and was denied, whereupon an appeal of such conviction was
taken to this court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of conviction of the offense of unlawfully possessing a
narcotic drug be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 28th day of May, 1965, a petition was
filed in the Second District Juvenile Court of Sait
Lake County, State of Utah, by William A. Kerr, a
probation officer of such court, alleging that Elizabeth Ann Glasg]ow, then age fifteen, was a dependent child whose future custody should be adjudicated by that court. On June 28, 1965, the petition was amended indicating that said child did, on
June 10, 1965, run away from the home of her aunt
and uncle (in whose home such child had been residing), and that her whereabouts remained unknown until Tune 28, 1965 (TR-358). On that date, a
search and seizure warrant was issued by Judge R.
W. Garff, Jr. of that court commanding any peace
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officer of the State of Utah to "forthwith take into
custody the . . . child, and detain her in the Salt
Lake County Detention Center; that if need be, said
officer may enter by force the residence ... " of Dave
Beckstead and Eugene Meyers at 553 Third Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for the purpose of searching
for said child.
Armed with the search warrant, Officer Fran
Kari of the Salt Lake City Police Department, accompanied by officers Donald Lindsey and Dan Waters
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, went to the
residence 1ocated at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on June 29, 1965 (TR-153). A search was
made of the premises to find the child, or evidence
as to her whereabouts (TR-158, -159). At the time of
the arrival by the officers at the residence located
at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, they had a conversation with a Mr. Floyd Brown, property manager for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company,
which company at that time was managing the residence (TR-116). Mr. Brown gave the officers permission to enter the house after being advised that they
possessed a search warrant (TR-119, 154).
The residence at 553 Third Avenue had been
rented by Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company
to a Mrs. James Gibson (TR-116). Mrs. James Gibson
was later identified by Mr. Brown to be Virginia
Hall (TR-117. 201).
Immediately preceeding the arrival of the officers, Mr. Brown was on the premises investigating
a nuisance complaint lodged by a neighbor (TR-

4
117). At that time the doorbell rang and Mr. Brown
proceeded to the front of the house where he saw '
the appellant, Eugene Meyers. Brown asked appellant what he was doing there, whereupon the appellant informed Brown that he was there to cut the
lawn and that he was a friend of Mrs. Gibson (TR118).

When the officers and Mr. Brown entered the
residence, they found Mr. Meyers standing behind
the kitchen door (TR-119, 170). Officer Lindsey inquired of appellant what he was doing, and appellant advised Officer Lindsey that he was there to ,
cut the lawn (TR-170). Officer Kari advised appellant
that the officers were there in an effort to locate the '
runaway child. Meyers replied that the only girl at
the residence was a sister of the tenant. Meyers advised Officer Kari that he did not know where she
was at that time, but that he thought the older sister ,
had taken the child to the doctor because of illness.
Officer Kari then asked appellant if it was all
right if the officers were to "look the place over,"
whereupon appellant replied that "it was all right
with him. He was just there to mow the lawn." (TR155).
1

1

A search was made of the premises. The officers advised appellant that they had a search and
seizure warrant for that residence. The appellant
claimed he did not live at the residence, and did not
ask to see the search warrant (TR-49, -50, -54).
The search was made by the officers of the main
floor and the second floor. A bedroom, designated

1
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as bedroom "A" on Exhibit 2-D (TR-32), was locked.
Mr. Brown obtained a key to that bedroom, which
was ultimately searched by the officers.
The runaway child was not present in that bedroom. However, the officers, in searching for evidence as to her whereabouts, did find a paper sack
containing what was later determined to be narcotics (TR-233, -234).
Certain items belonging to the appellant were
found in bedroom A" and were taken by the police
officers. Included among those items were an automotive repair bill with appellant's name on it (TR283); a Utah drivers license in the name of appellant (TR-301); and prescription bottles with appellant's name on the labels (TR-60). Certain other items
were taken from the bedroom designated as bedroom A, including certain clothing, a tool box,
a car battery, a TV-record player, and records (TR173, 180). Those items were taken at the request of
Mr. Brown, who was in the process of evicting those
tenants from that residence (TR-186).
11

11

11

Testimony was given by Officer Lindsey that on
two occasions the appellant had a conversation with
the officer in which he requested the return of certain items taken from bedroom "A." Included in the
request were the clothing, records, auto battery and
record player (TR-190, 195, 196, 209).
As to other factual maters, respondent relies on
the Statement of Facts contained in appellant's brief
on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OFFICERS WERE PROPERLY ON
THE PREMISES SEARCHED AND ANY NARCOTICS SEIZED AS A RESULT THEREOF
COULD PROPERLY BE USED AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST APPELLANT.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
vides:

§

58-13a-2 (1963) pro-

It shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess,
have under his control. ... any narcotic drug except
as authorized in this act.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
1967) provides:

§

58-l 3a-29 (Supp.

All narcotic drugs, or other habit-forming drugs,
depressants or stimulants as defined in this act, ...
may be seized by any peace officer; ...

The officers, in searching the premises at 553
Third Avenue, were looking for the whereabouts
of the runaway child or evidence as to her whereabouts (TR-34, 122). In the course of their search for
such evidence, they observed certain iterns which,
in the opinion of officers Lindsey and Waters, were
narcotics. As such, the officers, seized the contraband and secured it for later testing by the State
chemist (TR-198).
The officers had a search warrant issued by
the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County which authorized them to
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forthwith take into custody the above child
and detain her in the Salt Lake County Detention
Center; that if need be, said officer may enter by
force the residence of Dave Beckstead for the purpose of searching for said child.

The search warrant was issued pursuant to the
provisions of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23
(1963), the pertinent provisions of which are:
When it appears to the court on petition filed by
any person who in the opinion of the court is bona
fide acting in the inerest of any child, that there
is reasonable cause to suspect that such child under
eighteen years has been or is being ill-treated, is
dependent or neglected, in any place within the
jurisdiction of the court, in a manner likely to cause
the child unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious
to its health or morals, the court may issue a warrant authorizing any ... peace officer ... to search
for the child, and to take and detain it in a place
of safety ... Any person authorized by such search
warrant served upon . . . the c.ustodian of the
premises to search for any child and to take it and
detain it ... may enter, ... by force, any house,
building or other place specified in the warrant,
and may remove the child therefrom.

A petition had been filed in the Second District
Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County in the interest
of Elizabeth Ann Glosgow on May 28, 1965, and
amended on June 28, 1965 alleging that said child
did "run away from the home of her aunt .and uncle
on June 10, 1965, and her whereabouts remained
unknown until June 28, 1965" (TR-358). The petition
was signed by William A. Kerr, a probation officer.
The petition was verified by Mr. Kerr.

8
Utah Const. Art.

I:§ 14 states:

. . . no warrant shall be issued but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized

Respondent submits that the requirements ol
Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23 (1963) and
Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 were fully met, the issuance
of the warrant was proper and the warrant was
valid. A verified petition was on file with the Juve·
nile Court and executed by Mr. Kerr, a person ob·
viously acting in the interest of the child. Officer ·
Kari further swore before Judge Garff of the Juve·
nile Court as to the facts surrounding her kn owl·
edge concerning the child's whereabouts prior to
the issuance of the search warrant by Judge Garf!
(TR-11. 13, 14).
Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-23 (1963)
requires that there be reasonable cause for the Juvenile Court to suspect that a child under eighteen
years is neglected or in any place likely to be in·
jurious to the health or morals of the child. If the
court so suspects, it may issue a warrant authoriz·
ing any peace officer to search for the child, take it
and detain it.
In this instance the Juvenile Court determined
there was reasonable cause to suspect the child
was in a place likely to be injurious to her health
and morals, and accordingly issued the warrant.
There appeared probable cause for the issuance of

9

the warrant, which was supported by the oath of
Officer Kari. Since the statute under which the
search warrant was issued required no execution
of an affidavit in support of the search warrant, as
it" presently required by Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-l 11 (Supp. 1967) and is also required
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-4 (1953), there was no
violation of either Repl. Vol. 6, Utah Code Ann. §
55-10-23 (1963), Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 or United
States Const. Amend. IV and XN.
Armed with the search warrant, the officers
went to the premises to be searched where they obtained the permission and assistance of the property manager for Tracy-Collins Trust Company (TR32, 54, 119). Narcotics were found and seized.
The state will concede that as a general proposition property other than that for which the search
is being made under authority of a warrant cannot
be seized under '.1uthority of the warrant if the property seized does not come within the description of
the warrant, but where the officer has entered the
premises upon a valid search warrant and finds contraband or property the possession of which is illegal, the officer has the right to seize such property
although it was not described in the warrant. See
Brooks v. State, 235 Md. 23, 200 A.2d 127 (1964); People v. Collier. 169 Cal. App. 19, 336 P.2d 582 (1959).

It has been repeatedly held that, even though
not specifically described in a search warrant otherwise valid, the seizure of items, the possession of
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which constitutes a crime or which are instrumentalities or fruits of crime, is valid.
In the case of State v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254
Pac. 10 (1927), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld
the seizure of certain papers not particularly described in the search warrant. The Court stated:
While it is a general rule that the officer, in executing his search warrant, has no right to seize any
property by virtue of such warrant other than that
described therein, this does not effect his duty, if
lawfully upon the premises, to seize property that
he discovers by his own senses as being then and
there used as an instrumentality in the commission
of a crime.

See also Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251 (9th
Cir. 1925), in which officers lawfully on the premises
pursuant to a search and seizure warrant confiscat·
ed other evidence not contemplated within the
search warrant, which confiscation and seizure was
upheld on the basis that the possession of liquor
and maintenance of a nuisance were continuing of·
fenses and that these offenses were committed in
the presence of the officers making the search and
seizure. See also Saunders v. United States. 238 F.2d
145 (10th Cir. 1956), and Zachary v. United States,
275 F.2d 793, (6th Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364 U.S. 816,
reh. den., 364 U.S. 906 (1960). During the course of
the search, the officers found objects constituting
contraband, or which they suspected as being con·
traband. and as such they were entitled to take into
custody such objects. See Ker v. California, 374 US.
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23, (1 %3); Heffley- v. State. 83 Nev. _, ___ ,__ , 423 P.2d 666

(1967).

See also the case of State v. Wesson. Iowa 150
N.W.2d 284 (1967) in which officers searched a hotel
room for stolen checks and found stolen bonds,
possession of which was a crime. The Nebraska
court held that if the search was valid, the Fourth
Amendment did not prevent seizure of other property the possession of which is a crime. See also
Harris v. United States. 331 U.S. 145, (1947); 79 C.J.S.,
Search and Seizure. § 83 (e) (1952).
In the case of State v. McMann. 3 Ariz. App.
111, 412 P.2d 286 (1966), police officers obtained a
search warrant to search the defendant's residence
for marijuana. During the course of the search, the
officers discovered heroin, the possession -of which
constituted a crime for which defendant was -convicted. Defendant objected to the introductiori of
the heroin, claiming it should have been surpressed
as it was not described in the warrant. In affirming
the judgment of conviction, the court found no merit
to this contention.
It is well established that if a search produces
something different from that for which the officers-,
were initially searching it does not rende~ the sei~-J
ure of contraband invalid, since the officers do not
have to blind themselves to that which is apparent
merely because it is disconnected with the purpose
for which the search is initiated. See People v.
Smith. 26 Cal. Reptr. 620 (1962); United States ex rel,
Stoner v. Myers. 219 F.Supp. 908 (D.C. Pa. 1963); Peo.:.
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pie v. R'.raps, 48 Cal. Reptr. 89 (1965); State v. Blood,
190 Kan. 812, 378 P.2d 548 (1963).

Since the contraband narcotics seized by the
officers was lawfully obtained, it could be used to
prosecute appellant for an offense totally unrelated
to that upon which the search was founded. See
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, (1920); and
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
In Harris v. U.S., supra, the court stated at 331
U.S. 145, 155:
... A crime was thus being committed in the very
presence of the agents conducting the search. Nothing in the decisions of the court give support to the
suggestion that under such circumstances the lawenforcement officials must impotently stand aside
and refrain from seizing such contraband material.
If entry upon the premises be authorized and the
search which followed be valid, there is nothing in
the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure
by law-enforcement agents of ... property the possession of which is a crime, even though the officers
are not aware that such property is on the premises
when the search is initiated.

Even though the search of the apartment was
authorized for one purpose, i.e., the runaway girl,
the taking of contraband narcotics found in that
search would not be in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. The evidence was admissable
against defendant in this action, and the trial court
properly refused to quash the warrant or suppress
the evidence.
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POINT II
APPELLANT DISCLAIMED AND DISAVOWED ANY INTEREST IN THE PREMISES
SEARCHED, CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH,
AND THEREFOR LACKED STANDING TO
MOVE TO SUPPRESS J'.-~ARCOTICS SEIZED AS
A RESULT OF THE SEARCH.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. (emphasis added.)

Utah Const. art. I, § 14, provides, in effect, the
same guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States has been made applicable to the
states and enforceable against the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolfe v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, (1949); Ker
v. California. supra. A person may waive his right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizures, and
no rule of public policy forbids such waiver. One
can validly consent to a search of his premises, and
consent will render competent the evidence thus
obtained. By consent to a search and waiver of right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
the defendant relinquishes the protection of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
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which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and also relinquished protection given by the
state constitution's provision against unlawful search
and seizure. See State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, S.E.2d
61 (1961); People v. Harris, 34 Ill.2d 282, 215 N.E.2d
214, cert. den. 384 "Q.1.' 993 (1966). Although a consent to a search must be proved by the prosecution
by clear and positive evidence and that there must
be no duress or c~of("~actual or implied, the
prosecution must show that consent is unequivical
and specific, freely and intelligently given. (See
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (C.A.D.C. 1951);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, (1938).
In this instance the officers were validly on the
premises to make a search thereof. Consequently,
the consent, or lack thereof, by the appellant was
not necessary in order for the officers to search the
premises.
Although appellant argues that he did not consent, and that he did not waive any interest in and
to the premises to be searched or disclaim any interest in and to the premises to be searched, it has
been stated that the determination of the voluntariness of the consent must be tested by the totality of
the circumstances surrounding t h e purported
waiver or disclaimer of the constitutional rights. See
Shultz v. United States, 351 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1965),
United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763 (2nd Cir. 1959).
All the evidence, including the various circumstances of the giving of consent or disclaimer, must
be objectively viewed with diligent care by the triai
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court, and if the court finds no evidence showing
coersion or duress, it is proper to hold that the consent was voluntary or the disclaimer was voluntary
and was knowledgable on the part of the defendant.
Since the appellant, at the time of his motion to
suppress, motion to quash, or at the time of trial,
offered no testimony or evidence contradictory to
the evidence concerning his disclaimer and waiver,
the statement of facts regarding his disclaimer and
waiver remains unchallenged.
Such was the finding of the trial court, and the
appellant offered no contradictory evidence with
respect thereto. It follows that this court should uphold that determination by the trial court. Since the
trial court, having the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and being able to evalucate their
credibility, is in the best position to weigh the significance of the pertinent facts involved and determine whether, under the totality of all the facts and
circumstances, the defendant voluntarily consented
to the search or disclaimed any interest in and to
the property to be searched, this court should affirm that determination of the trial court.
In disclaimin-J and disavowing any interest in
the premises, the appellant stated he was just there
to cut the lawn (TR-118, 155, 170). He further consented that the search "was all right with him" (TR155). He claimed he did not live at the residence to
be searched, and did not ask to see the search warrant (TR-49, 50, 54). Respondent submits that this uncontroverted testimony constitutes a disclaimer and
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disavowal of any interest in and to the premises
searched, and further constitutes a consent to
search.
The following cases have held language similar to that of appellant's sufficient to constitute consent to search:
People v. Hood, 149 Cal. App. 36, 309 P.2d 135
(1957)-"Go ahead."
People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956)
--"Go ahead."
Ia re Watson's Petition, 146 Mont. 125, 404 P.2d
315 (1965)-"Yes, go right ahead; I have nothing
to hide."
People v. Galle, 153 Cal. App. 88, 314 P.2d 58
(1957) ,-"Go right ahead."
People v. McCoy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1961)-"Well,
go ahead. It's not my room."
State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580
(1965)-If they (Town Marshall) wanted to go
ahead knowing they were violating the law to make
the search, ... they could go.

As a general proposition, the law with respect
to disclaimer of interest is stated in 79 C.J.S. Search·
es and Seizures, § 60 (1952) as follows:
When a person disclaims interest in the premises
or possessions searched, or in the article seized, he
cannot question the legality of the search and
seizure.

See also Show v. United States, 209 F.2d 298
(C.A.,D.C. 1953). cei;f den. 347 U.S. 905 (1954); Com·
monwealth v. Mayer, 359 Mass 253, 207 NE.2d 686
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(1965); Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1958); Neil v. State, 206 Tenn. 492, 344 S.W.2d 731
(1960).
Assuming, arguendo, that the search warrant
issued by the Juvenile Court was invalid, the appellant nonetheless consented to the search and
disclaimed any interest in the premises searched
or property seized. As such he cannot now claim
that his rights have been violated. Respondent submits, however, that the officers were legally on the
premises by reason of the search warrant, and the
appellant's consent and disclaimer further supports
the validity of the search and seizure.
By reason of the disclaimer and consent of appellant, he lacked standing to move to suppress the
narcotics seized. Appellant relies heavily on the
case of United States v, Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
However that case is easily distinguishable in that
in the Jeffers case the police officers who conducted
thes earch of the hotel room which Jeffers had access to did not have a search warrant, nor were the
occupants of the room present at the time of the
search. The court stated at 342 U.S. 52:
... In entering the room and making the search
for the sole purpose of seizing respondent's narcotics, the officers not only proceeded without a
warrant or other legal authority, but their intrusion
was conducted surreptitiously and by means denounced as criminal.

In this case, as previously pointed out, the officers were on the premises properly, armed with a
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warrant, and further had the consent of defendant
to search and his disclaimer and disavowal of any
interest in and to the premises.
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, (1960), the
defendant was present at the time of the search. The
court, at 362 U.S. 267, recognized that:
... anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be
used against him.

1he question then posed is whether or not the
appellant was legitimatelv on the premises in order
that the merits of his motion to suppress be adjudicated. The trial court, having considered the same.
concluded that the appellant had no proper stand·
ing to move to suppress by reason of that fact that
he had previously disclaimed any interest in and
to the premises (see Memorandum Decision, TR
362-370).
The trial court could and did find that the ap·
pellant's statement to the police amounted to a total
disclaimer or disavowal of any right or interest in
connection with the premises. Accordingly the
police could take him at his word. The defendant
cannot now be heard to complain that his constitu·
tional rights were violated.
In People v. McCoy, supra. a somewhat similar
case wherein the defendant disclaimed any in·
terest to the premises, the court held the_ evidence
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seized admissable against defendant, stating at 16
Cal. Rep tr. 117, 118:
"We do not believe the appellant's false disclaimer
of residency vitiated the consent given to search the
room; the evidence obtained was not inadmissable
as the product of an unlawful search and seizure."

In the case of State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38,
414 P.2d 958, 960, (1966), this court stated:
In approaching the problem of standing, the origin
and nature of the rule concerning suppression
should be noted. Evidence is suppressed or excluded only if the same was obtained by a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a person's right of privacy and property. Evidence sought
to be excluded is admissable, however, until the accused has established that his rights under the rule
have been invaded. Citing Murray v. United States,
338 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1964). See Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.C. 125, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(1960).
Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of one
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as
a basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he
alleges, and if the allegation be disputed, that he
establish, that he himself was a victim of an invasion of privacy. Under this philosophy, the appellant has no standing because he was not a victim of
an invasion of privacy. To give a person standing
who neither alleges nor establishes the proprietory
nor possessory interest in the car and who in fact
was without ownership therein, so determined before the search was made, would clearly be an extention beyond the scope that the constitutional
protection was intended to cover.

The appellant did not in any sense contradict
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the testimony of the officers, nor was there any eV].
dence offered by the appellant that there had been
any coercion or that appellant was submitting to
any implied authority at the occasion at the resl·
dence located at 553 Third Avenue, or that appellant
did not know what he was doing at the time. Full
opportunity was afforded the appellant to show
force, duress, or other improper methods used, il
such was the fact. This he entirely failed to do. Appellant also failed to demonstrate that he was the
victim of an invasion of privacy.
Respondent submits that the trial court's finding
in this regard should not be disturbed in view ol
the fact that the evidence in the record does not
compell a different finding since the appellant herein did not offer any testimony or evidence with respect to such disclaimer of interest in and to the
premises to be searched, waiver of his right to object to the search, or consent to the search. See
Cassity v. Castagno. 10 Utah 2d 16, 347 P.2d 834
(1959); Napp v. Life Insurance Corp. of America, 8
Utah 2d 220, 332 P.2d 662 (1959); DeVas v. Noble, 13
Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, cert. den., 371 U.S. 82l
(1962).
As this Court stated in State v. Tuttle. supra, at
399 P.2d 580, 582:
"The practical exigencies of a trial render it imperative that the trial judge have the PUfTogative of
ruling upon questions of admissability of evidence
and upon issues of fact incidental to that purpose.
For this reason, and because of his position of advantage to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
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other factors bearing on credibility, his ruling
thereon should not be disturbed unless it clearly
appears he was in error. If the court were not indulged this prerogative and were bound by any
story which a self-interested witness may tell which
could make a search unlawful, it requires but brief
reflection to reveal what mischief could result in
thwarting efforts of officers proceeding reasonably
and in good faith to solve crimes and enforce the
law."
POINT III
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT.

Officer Lindsey testified as to certain conversations had with appellant following the filing of a
complaint against appellant for this offense. The
conversations did not take on the complexion of
questioning or interrogation (TR-177, 178).
The first conversation was a telephone call from
appellant to Officer Lindsey, wherein,
". . . he told me he wanted to get his things we had
taken out of that apartment." (TR 178), (see also
TR 195).

The second conversation occurred in a police
vehicle, also between appellant and Officer Lindsey. Among other subjects discussed,
". . . Mr. Meyers said he wanted to get his stuff
back." (TR 17.9), (see also TR 196).

Prescription bottles were taken by the officers
from bedroom "A" with the name "Eugene Meyers"
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on the label (TR 198). Tablets, pills, capsules, and the
prescription bottles were all found in a paper bag
(TR 198). Certain of the contents of that bag were
later determined to be narcotics (TR-232, 233, 234,).
Appellant's driver's license was taken from the
room, plus articles of clothing and other personal
property (TR-301). Appellant stayed in bedroom "A",
had a key to that bedroom, was seen coming and
going from that residence, and was observed in
bedroom "A" with a bottle containing pills (TR-135138).
Respondent submits there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
guilty of the offense charged.
Yet appellant complains that he was prejudiced
by the trial court allowing Officer Lindsey's testimony concerning the conversations had between
the officer and appellant, since no MIRANDA warnings were given to appellant.
In the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 383
U.S. 903 (1966) the Supreme Court specifically
pointed out that the decision is limited to in-custody
interrogation in a police dominated atmosphere. The
Court stated at 86 S. Ct. 1612:
"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody .. .' (emphasis added)

The Court further stated at page 1630:

23
"Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling- influence is, of course, admissable in evidence ... There is no requirement that
police stop a person . . . who calls the police to
offer a confession or any other statement he desires
to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment and are not
affected by our holding today."

The telephone conversation was admitted in
evidence as a declaration or admission against interest by appellant, not as a confession to the crime
charged. The second conversation for the same
reason. There was no substantive difference in the
two conversations. Neither conversation took on the
complexion of questioning or interrogation, and it
should be pointed out that the telephone conversation was initiated by the appellant. Respondent submits that both conversations were entered into voluntarily by appellant without any compelling influence whatsoever.
Assuming, arguendo. that the second conversation, standing alone, would not be admissable,
respondent submits that bv reason of the fact that
the first and second conversations are basically
identical, the admission of the second conversation
is at best harmless error with no resulting prejudice
to appellant. There is nothing in the record to indicate a denial of right or abuse of a privilege which
put the appellant at any substantial disadvantage
or prejudice by reason of the admission of the second conversation.
The alleged error in the admission of appellant's statements ca.n and should be disregarded by
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this Court. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (1953); State
v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966);
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964).
Neither error nor prejudice can be assumed by
this Court, and the burden is upon the appellant to
show error or prejudice. The underlying principle
of protections afforded an accused is treatment in
conformity with commonly accepted standards of
decency and fairness. Respondent submits that appellant has failed to demonstrate, nor does the record contain, any indication that appellant was not
afforded a fair trial and in all regards treated decently and fairly. See State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d
234, 419 P.2d 770 0966).
The appellant was afforded the opportunity to
have heard his motions · to suppress, motion to
quash, trial by jury, motions to dismiss, motion for
mistrial and motion for new trial. Appellant was represented by able counsel at all stages. He was given
a full and fair opportunity to present his case. Accordingly, all presumptions favor the validity of the
judgment. State v. Seymour, supra.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the rulings of the trial court with respect to appellant's
motions to suppress, quash, dismiss, mistrial, new
trial, and its ruling on the admissability of evidence
were in all respects proper. Appellant has shown no
basis upon which this court should grant the relief

•
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he asks. Accordingly respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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